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And worse of all, my independence is gone; for now, of course, I 
shall have to live with one of  my children, and I don’t know which 
of  us will hate it the most. 
An old man’s lament, quoted in Epstein (1922) 
The living arrangements of elderly retirees have undergone profound changes 
since the end of the last century. In  1880, close to half of  retired men were 
living with their children or other relatives. Today, only  5  percent  are, sug- 
gesting that the family now plays a diminished role in old-age support. 
What could have displaced the dependence  of  the elderly on family and 
contributed to the rise in independent, retiree households? One possible expla- 
nation includes changes in social values and expectations. A common percep- 
tion is that in the past, unlike today, “nobody ever thought of not taking care 
of their own,”’ Alternatively, improvements in the health of the elderly and in 
household technology may now enable the elderly to live alone. The leisurely 
retirement lifestyle that has become the postwar ideal is often possible only by 
resettlement to another community with a better climate or recreational ame- 
nities. Many of the elderly may no longer have the option of living with their 
children. Declines in fertility and increases in life expectancy at older ages 
have increased the ratio of aged parents to adult children, with the result that, 
whereas in the past the burden of care was spread among many children, today 
it is spread among few. Finally, rising incomes, including Social Security and 
private pensions, may have caused more of the elderly to live by themselves. 
If the elderly prefer to live by themselves rather than with their children, they 
will be able to do so only if they have sufficient income. In this chapter I inves- 
tigate whether social values dictated different behavior in the past than today 
or whether increases in income have always been associated with an increased 
demand for the privacy and autonomy provided  by  separate living  arrange- 
ments. If the latter proves to be the case, then rising incomes have contributed 
enormously to the well-being of the elderly. 
First, however, I discuss trends in the living arrangements of  the elderly. 
Many observers, noting the sharp increase in the percentage of single, elderly 
households after 1940, have argued that Social Security has displaced the fam- 
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ily as a means of  financial support (e.g., Michael, Fuchs, and Scott 1980; 
Schorr 1960). But I will show that the percentage of  retired men sixty-five 
years of age or older living either alone or with only their wives in the house- 
hold has been rising since 1880. Many economists, demographers, and histori- 
ans have been unaware of the trend prior to 1940 because it has been disguised 
in more aggregated statistics by  the relatively low retirement rates that pre- 
vailed in the past and by the unchanging coresidence patterns of  labor force 
participants. This chapter first examines the long-term trend in coresidence 
patterns among elderly males and then assesses explanations for the trend. 
6.1  Trends in the Living Arrangements of the Elderly 
The majority of older men have always headed their own households. Over 
three-quarters did in 1880 and close to 90 percent in  1990. However, the frac- 
tion of retired men heading their own households was low at the beginning of 
the century and has risen steadily since 1880. Among men  still in the labor 
force, change came only after 1940 (see fig. 6.1). 
Although whether an elderly man was a household head is a useful indicator 
of authority and independence, it is a poor indicator of whether he lived alone 
or surrounded by  family members. Another indicator of  living arrangements 
is the percentage of elderly men living in extended families, here defined as 
households where a family member other than the spouse was present. For the 
most part, these are households in which the adult children are present, but 
occasionally they include other relatives. Figure 6.2 shows that the decline in 
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Fig. 6.1 
household heads, by retirement status 
Note: Estimated from the integrated public-use census sample (Ruggles and Sobek 1995) using 
the definition of gainful employment prior to 1940 and the current definition thereafter. 
Percentage of noninstitutionalized  men sixty-five or older who were 108  Chapter6 
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Fig. 6.2  Percentage of noninstitutionalized  men sixty-five or older not living in 
extended families, by retirement status 
Sources: See fig. 6.1. 
Note:  Living in an extended family is defined as living in a household in which family members 
other than the wife are present. 
the percentage of men at least sixty-five years old living in extended families 
from 1880  to 1940 occurred among both the retired and those still in the labor 
force. However, part of the decline may be due, not to the elderly being less 
likely to live in the households of  their children or other relatives, but to de- 
clines in the age at which children leave home, in declines in the propensity of 
the elderly to take in relatives, or declines in numbers of dependent children. 
Figure 6.3, therefore, subdivides the census data even further. 
Figure 6.3 classifies living arrangements as (1) household head and living 
in an extended family, (2) household head and not living in an extended family, 
(3) not household head and living in an extended family, and (4) not household 
head and not living in an extended family. Men in this last category lived with 
friends or as boarders and never constituted more than 7 percent of the popula- 
tion. Men who were household heads and lived in an extended family lived 
mainly with their unmarried, adult children.* The third category of households, 
those that the elderly man did not head but in which he lived with his children, 
consisted primarily of households into which the children had welcomed their 
aged parents. Even at the beginning of the century, instances of children taking 
over the households of their parents were relatively few.' 
Since 1880 the largest change in the residence arrangements of noninstitu- 
tionalized men older than 64 has arisen from the declining proportion living 
as household heads with children (see fig. 6.3). A narrowing age difference 
between  spouses and declines in fertility have led to an earlier stopping of 
child rearing among men, making it less likely that an older man would have 

































 110  Chapter 6 
factor that may have contributed to the post-1940 decline in the age at which 
children leave home. The proportion  living as household heads with children 
has been replaced by the fraction living as household heads with only a spouse. 
The percentage  of  men  who were not household heads and who lived with 
their children or other relatives has also fallen, but the decline was not as pro- 
nounced. 
Figure 6.3 shows that differences in living arrangements by retirement status 
were much larger in the past than they are today. Whereas at the beginning of 
the century the most common form of living arrangement among men older 
than sixty-four who were still in the labor force was as head of a household in 
which other family members lived, the most common form of living arrange- 
ment for the retired was coresidence with children in a household that they did 
not head. In contrast, the most common form of living arrangement today for 
both the retired and those still in the labor force is as head of a household in 
which only a spouse is present. For men still in the labor force, the percentage 
heading households in which children were present fell, and the proportion 
heading single, elderly households rose, suggesting that, for those still in the 
labor force, the largest changes in living arrangements have been caused by 
children leaving home. Among the retired the biggest change in living arrange- 
ments was the decline in the percentage of men living with their children, from 
46 percent in  1880, to 22 percent in 1940, to 5 percent in 1990. In fact, fully 
59 percent of the 1880-1990  decline in the percentage of retirees residing with 
their children or other relatives occurred before 1940. It is this change in cores- 
idence among the retired  that will be the focus of  my subsequent empirical 
work. I prefer examining whether  parents are in their children’s households 
rather than  whether they live in a single household to avoid controlling for 
differences in the age at which children leave home. Examining whether par- 
ents live in their childrens’ households is also important because there has been 
so much change in this measure among the retired. This change is not reflected 
in the overall statistics because retirement rates were relatively low in the past. 
The decline in the percentage of retirees residing with their children or other 
relatives observed in figure 6.3 occurred among the foreign and the native born, 
among whites and blacks, among farm and nonfarm  dwellers, and in  large 
cities and rural  areas. A larger percentage of retirees lived with children or 
other relatives in nonmetropolitan areas in 1880 and  1900, but by  1910 the 
living arrangements of the retired in nonmetropolitan areas resembled those of 
the retired in metropolitan areas (see fig. 6.4). Early social observers noted the 
decline of the multigenerational family with alarm. Epstein (1922,6) lamented 
that the “conditions of impotence in old age are augmented still further by the 
break-up of the family unit in modern society. With increasing rapidity home 
ties and family solidarity are being weakened and broken by the mobility so 
essential  to modern industrial development.. . . Thousands of aged workers 
find themselves in a strange country without friends or relatives.” 
Many workers,  however, still could and did depend on their families for 11  1  Displacing the Family 
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Fig. 6.4  Percentage not household heads and living in an extended family 
among noninstitutionalized retired men sixty-five or older, by metropolitan 
status 
Sources: For sources and definitions, see tables 6.1  and 6.2. 
support. The 1919 Ohio Commission on Health Insurance and Old Age Pen- 
sions estimated that, in Hamilton and Cincinnati, 15-25  percent of people over 
age fifty were dependent on relatives or friends (cited in Epstein  1928, 50).4 
The New York State Commission on Old Age Security (1930) found that, in 
1925-29,  half of  men and women older than  sixty-four were dependent  on 
relatives  and friends. Estimates for 1937 suggest that between two-fifths and 
half of persons age sixty-five or older were dependent on relatives or friends 
and that over three-quarters  were at least partially dependent on children or 
other family  members or on friends  (Shearon  1938). Wentworth  (1950) re- 
ported that one of the ways Social Security beneficiaries  who retired in 1941 
were able to live on their retirement income was by living in joint households 
or receiving contributions from relatives. Figure 6.3 above indicates that more 
than 40 percent of retired men lived with children or other relatives in  1880 
and more than 30 percent  in  1920. Over time, the coresidence  rates  of the 
retired fell more sharply than those of men in the labor force, with the result 
that, by  1990, the coresidence rates of the retired were virtually indistinguish- 
able from those of men in the labor force. This pattern of catch-up implies that 
only in the past was retirement accompanied by moves into children? homes 
or children taking over their parents'  households. 
Loss of  independence on retirement is also seen among Union army veter- 
ans. Thirty-seven percent of men who retired between  1900 and 1910 moved 
on retiring, generally to another town within the same county. In contrast, only 
21 percent of  those still remaining in the labor force moved, and, when they 
did move, they tended to move longer distances. When retired men did move, 112  Chapter6 
they lost their head-of-household status, generally to their children. Thirty per- 
cent of all retirees who moved lost head-of-household status, compared to only 
9 percent of  nonretirees. Retirement clearly brought with it dependence on 
family members. 
The poor who could no longer work and had no children or family members 
to fall back on for support, whether because they were childless, had outlived 
their children, or had children too poor to support them, became dependent on 
private or public charity. The  1910 Massachusetts Commission on Old Age 
Pensions estimated that 3 percent of those age sixty-five or older received ei- 
ther public or private poor relief and that another 3 percent were in either alms- 
houses or private old-age homes. In Massachusetts, 64 percent of almshouse 
inmates had no living children, and only 8 percent had children or other near 
relatives judged financially able to assist them.5 
Relatively few of the elderly have ever been institutionalized (see fig. 6.5), 
never more than 6 percent of the elderly population, yet the poorhouse played 
a large role in the debate over old-age pensions. The majority of almshouse 
inmates (53 percent in 1904 and 67 percent in 1923) were above the age of 
sixty (Haber and Gratton  1994, 123). Advocates of pensions argued that “a 
pension system would take a large number of inmates out of  the poor house 
and put them back in their homes, and would, in general greatly reduce the 
outlay for poor relief” (Massachusetts Commission on Old Age Pensions 19  10, 
254). Epstein (1922, 59) claimed that the “prospect of the poorhouse with its 
stigma of pauperism, so detestable to the honest wage-earner, haunts him like 
a dark shadow and saps every bit of his vitality.” When, in Helvering v. Davis 
(1937), Supreme Court Justice Cardozo asserted the constitutionality of the 
Social Security Act, he wrote that “the hope behind this statute is to save men 
and women from the rigors of the poorhouse as well as from the haunting fear 
that such a lot awaits them when journey’s end is near” (National Conference 
on Social Welfare 1985, 129). State commissions had been less sanguine. They 
judged 90 percent of almshouse residents sixty-five years of age or older to be 
physically defective and believed that residents would not be able to live on 
small pensions unless  these  were  supplemented  by  assistance  from family 
members-an  assistance on which most inmates could not count because few 
had any living children (e.g., Massachusetts Commission on Old Age Pensions 
1910; Pennsylvania Old Age Pension Commission 1919). Social Security did 
empty the almshouses, but primarily because almshouse residents were ineligi- 
ble for benefits. Almshouses were merely replaced by private nursing homes 
in the 1930s and 1940s and by public nursing homes in the 1950s, when Social 
Security rules were amended. By 1940 the percentage of the elderly population 
that was institutionalized was higher than in 1920. 
Although Social Security has not had an effect on institutionalization rates, 
it is widely regarded as having displaced the care of the family. In the United 
States today the predominant flow of monetary transfers is from the older to 
the younger generation (McGany and Schoeni 1995). In contrast, in Malaysia 
monetary transfers flow primarily from the younger to the older generation 113  Displacing the Family 
Fig. 6.5  Percentage of population age sixty-five or older currently 
institutionalized,  men and women, 1880-1990 
Note: Institutionalization rates were estimated from Ruggles and Sobek  (1995). 
(Lillard and Willis 1997). Malaysia was characterized by  the absence of  any 
extensive public insurance and institutional social support programs, such as 
Social Security, during the period of observation. Information on the extent of 
monetary transfers from children to parents in the United States prior to Social 
Security is scanty, but information on the living arrangements of the elderly 
provides some clues. The results of  Michael, Fuchs, and Scott (1980) and 
Schorr (1960), suggesting that the decline in coresidence was faster among 
those receiving larger Social Security benefits, imply that, at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, the flow  of  transfers may  have been from younger to 
older generations. 
The likely effect of old-age pensions on the direction of the transfer of re- 
sources across generations was widely discussed even before the institution of 
Social Security. The 1910 Massachusetts Commission on Pensions and Annuit- 
ies concluded that pensions would have a disintegrating effect on the family 
(cited in Epstein 1928, 227). In contrast, advocates of state-provided pensions 
decried the burden that dependence imposed on young and old alike and ar- 
gued that both the elderly and their children would be happier if they could 
afford to live in separate dwellings (Epstein 1928, 144-48).  They even cited 
the Union army pension program as building up the family because children 
would be more likely to find a place in their homes for parents who could 
partially pay their own way.6 The old were viewed as a burden, not just on their 
children, but also on their children’s children, who would be “doomed to under- 
nourishment; and to a life in the midst of  crowded and unsanitary quarters . . . 
to leave school early in life and to join the ranks of the unskilled” (Epstein 
1922, 63). 
The burden  of  the elderly should not  be  exaggerated. Figure 6.3 above 114  Chapter6 
showed that the percentage of the retired living with family members has fallen 
steadily since  1880. Among  those individuals heading households  between 
1880 and  1920 and aged eighteen to forty-four, at most 9 percent  of  those 
within a ten-year age group had a parent present in the household. Contrary to 
the claims of social reformers, when an aged parent was present in the house- 
hold, the teenage children of the household head were less likely to be gain- 
fully employed and were more likely to be in school than if a parent was not 
present, controlling for household socioeconomic and demographic character- 
istics.’ So few of the elderly now live with their children that, in 1990, no more 
than 3 percent of children cared for their parents within their own homes. 
In the past, the burden of caring for elderly parents within the same house- 
hold fell primarily on the wealthier members of society. Figure 6.6 shows the 
relative probability  that a farmer, a professional  or proprietor, or an artisan 
aged  eighteen to  sixty-four would  have a parent  present  in the  household, 
where the probability is relative to that of a laborer.8 Relative to laborers, pro- 
fessionals and proprietors at the beginning of the century  were much more 
likely to have a parent present in the household, implying that transfers from 
child to parent depended on the child‘s earnings. Social historians have argued 
that, in the past, wealthy families felt obligated to take in  relatives with no 
means of support, leading to large extended families among the wealthy (e.g., 
Ruggles  1987). Only the wealthy could support nonproductive kin, hence the 
higher probability that elderly parents would reside in the homes of profession- 
als and proprietors rather than laborers. Lillard and Willis (1997) find that, in 
present-day Malaysia, the child‘s transfers to parents depend very significantly 
on the child‘s earnings. 
Over time, the income of children became a less important determinant of 
whether they took in their elderly parents. From 1900 to 1950 the probability 
that professionals and proprietors would have a parent present in the household 
did not rise as quickly as the absolute probability that a laborer would have a 
parent present. As incomes rose between 1900 and 1950, even low-wage labor- 
ers may have been able to afford to have a parent present in the household. 
They may have acquired houses large enough to provide for a parent in their 
own homes comfortably. After  1950, the probability  that a parent would be 
present in the household fell sharply across all occupational groups, but more 
sharply for professionals and proprietors than for laborers. In the aggregate, 
the probability of a professional or proprietor having a parent present in the 
household relative to that of laborer narrowed from 1900 to 1980, and by  1990 
professionals and proprietors were slightly less likely to have a parent present 
in their households than were laborers. It is this narrowing of differential prob- 
abilities that  suggests that  children’s income now has  a lessened  effect on 
whether their parents live in their households. 
The declining probability that a parent would be present in children’s house- 
holds regardless of children’s social class has been attributed to changing social 
values (Ruggles 1987; Smith 1979). In the past, children may have been more 115  Displacing the Family 
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Fig. 6.6 
among households headed by individuals aged eighteen to sixty-four, 1880-1990 
Nore; All probabilities have been divided by  that of laborers. Probabilities were predicted from 
probit regressions estimated from the integrated public-use samples and were evaluated at 1950 
mean values to account for differences in household characteristics and in the age structure of the 
population both over time and across occupational groups. 
Relative probability of having a parent present in the household, 
willing to welcome their aged parents into their own homes, and more parents 
may  have preferred  to live with their children. Alternatively,  rising  incomes 
may have enabled an increasingly  large fraction of the elderly to live alone. 
Before 1950, rising incomes and larger houses may have led more children to 
welcome their parents into their homes, but, after 19.50, increases in retirement 
income, particularly among widows, who were the parents most likely to reside 
with children, were large enough to outweigh this effect and caused more of 
the elderly to live alone. 
Census data provide some evidence that the elderly with higher incomes are 
more likely to live alone. As seen in figure 6.7, which plots the probability that 
an older man employed in a particular occupation would head his own house- 
hold relative to the probability that a laborer would, nonlaborers have always 
been more likely than laborers to head their own household.y  But, after 1950, 
differences in living arrangements narrowed sharply, suggesting that income is 
now a less important indicator not only of whether children take in their elderly 
parents but also of whether the employed elderly live with their children. Per- 
haps only those families with special needs or strong preferences for living 
together now do so. 
It is not possible to use the early censuses to test whether rising incomes 
induced more of the retired elderly to establish living quarters separate from 
those of their children. No information is available on the incomes of the re- 
tired. But it is the rise of single households among the retired that has been the 116  Chapter6 
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Fig. 6.7  Relative probability of heading own household, men sixty-five years of 
age and older and in labor force, 1880-1990 
Note:  All probabilities have been divided by  that of  laborers. Probabilities were predicted from 
probit regressions estimated from the integrated public-use samples and were evaluated at  1950 
mean values. 
ongoing, long-term process. Work using cross-sectional data from the 1960s 
and after suggests that income has a small effect on the propensity of the el- 
derly to live alone (Borsch-Supan et al. 1992; Schwartz, Danziger, and Smo- 
lensky 1984;  cf. Michael, Fuchs, and Scott 1980),  but the applicability of these 
estimates to periods prior to  1940 is questionable. Fortunately, Union army 
pension income can be used as a test of  revealed preference to determine 
whether coresidence or independent living was preferred by  retired, elderly 
men at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
6.2  Pensions and Living Arrangements 
The living arrangements of the elderly are the outcome of a joint decision 
between  adult  children  and  their  aged  parents  or  relatives. A  bargaining 
model-that  is, a model in which individual, not family, resources matter- 
would predict that, because Union army pensions were so large, representing 
30 percent of  the average income of  a manufacturing worker in  1910, they 
would enable veterans to live either on their own  or with their children and 
thus to pick their preferred residence option. Parents who wished to live with 
their children may have offered them financial transfers as compensation for 
the children having to listen to interminable Civil War  stones. In  return for 
transfers, parents may have received free market goods and services that might 
otherwise have had to be provided by the pensioners themselves, their spouses, 
or hired help. They would also have been near their grandchildren. But elderly 117  Displacing the Family 
retirees who chose to live with their children may have been more constrained 
in their choice of consumption bundles. For example, they may not have been 
able to increase the size of their living space and therefore guarantee them- 
selves a certain amount of privacy. 
In contrast to the bargaining model, a model of altruism predicts that total 
family income, not individual income, determines living arrangements. Chil- 
dren who take  their parents  into their homes will be motivated,  not  by  the 
prospect of financial transfers, but by the knowledge that their parents were 
being taken care of. The elderly who live alone do so, not because they can 
afford it, but because the family can afford it. Thus, children might transfer 
income to their parents to enable them to live on their own. Pension income 
would either partially or wholly displace children's transfers. If pension income 
is relatively  small, then pension amount might have either no or very little 
effect on the living arrangements of the elderly. But, because Union army pen- 
sions represented over 30 percent of average yearly income, the implied sub- 
stantial increase in total family income should have affected the living arrange- 
ments of the elderly. 
I  cannot observe the children's  decision; I  can observe only the veteran's 
decision. I subdivide this decision into two stages. The veteran first determines 
the best bundle of goods and household services that he can obtain under either 
living arrangement given his income, in the case of  a bargaining model, or 
both his and his children's income, in the case of  an altruism model. Although 
his income does not depend on the coresidence decision, the prices  that he 
faces for market goods and household services such as meal preparation  and 
personal care will vary. For some goods, he may face an infinite price under 
the coresidence option because he will have lost some degree of autonomy in 
his choice of goods. Utility when independent of family members can there- 
fore be written as U,(CF;  2)  and utility when living with family members as 
Ud(C,*;  Z), where C"  is the consumption bundle that is chosen, and Z is a 
vector of  demographic variables  and of utility  shifters  such as age and eth- 
nicity. If  U,(CT;  2)  2  Ud(C,*;  Z), the veteran will maintain  an independent 
household. Transforming the utility functions into indirect utility functions, the 
veteran will maintain an independent household if y(  p,,  y;  2)  2  V,(  p,, y;  Z), 
where p,  is the price of the bundle when independent, pd is the price of the 
bundle when dependent, and y is income. Therefore, if the indirect utility func- 
tions are assumed to be linear in their arguments, the utility-maximizing  indi- 
vidual evaiuates the decision function 
Although the value of I*  is not observed, several indicators of living arrange- 
ments are, such as whether an individual was a household head or whether the 
individual ever lived with extended family members. 
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Fig. 6.8  Comparison of percentage household head or percentage not living in extended 
family, by retirement status, between Union army sample and random samples of white 
veterans and nonveterans aged sixty to eighty-seven, 1910 
Note; The random sample was drawn from the integrated public-use sample of the  1910 census (Ruggles and 
Sobck  1995) and was restricted to white, noninstitutionalized men who either were born in a Union state or, if 
foreign born, immigrated prior to the Civil War. Veterans and nonveterans are identified in the sample. The random 
sample was reweighted to have the same geographic distribution as the Union army sample. Reweighting by age 
would not materially change the results. The main difference between  the Union army sample and the national 
sample of either veterans or nonveterans is rural residence, not age. Living  in an extended family is defined as 
living in a household in which family members other than the wife are present. Union  Army  Sample 
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Fig. 6.9  Comparison of percentage household head and percentage not living in extended 
family, by retirement status, between Union army sample and random samples of white 
veterans and nonveterans aged sixty to eighty-seven, 1910 
Sources: See table 6.8. 
Note; Living in an extended family is defined as living in a household in which family members other than the 
wife are present. 120  Chapter6 
arrangements of  the elderly. Seventy-six percent of  retired men in the Union 
army  sample and 74 percent in the random sample of  Union army veterans 
were household heads in 1910.  But only 64 percent of retired nonveterans were 
household heads. The percentage of retired Union army veterans living with 
no family members other than their wives was 41 percent in the Union army 
sample and 48 percent in the random sample. In contrast, 3 1 percent of retired 
nonveterans in the random sample were living with no family members other 
than their wives. Figure 6.9 suggests that there were large differences by vet- 
eran status in the percentage of older men living without any children in the 
household  and in the percentage of  older men living as dependents in their 
children’s homes. Thirty-eight percent of retired veterans in the Union army 
sample and 36 percent of retired veterans in the random sample headed fami- 
lies consisting only of the elderly couple. Only 26 percent of retired nonveter- 
ans did so. Twenty percent of retired veterans in the Union army sample and 
14 percent in the random sample lived with a relative who was the household 
head. In contrast, 32 percent of  retired nonveterans in the random sample did 
so.10 
Figure 6.9, therefore, suggests that  the probability  of  parents  living with 
their children as dependents depended on the parents’ income. Recall that I 
will be examining this variable in the subsequent empirical work. The proba- 
bility of parents heading households in which there were no children present 
depended both on their income and on whether their children had left home. 
But there were no differences in the percentage of retirees heading households 
in which children were present, suggesting that whether children remained in 
a household  headed  by  their elderly parents did not depend on their father’s 
veteran status. 
Although both figures 6.8 and 6.9 are suggestive, they are inconclusive. Vet- 
erans are a selected sample. Lower morbidity rates or higher incomes among 
veterans  may  have  decreased their probability  of  living  in  their  relatives’ 
households relative to that of nonveterans. Therefore, I compare living arrange- 
ments among retired  veterans controlling for characteristics  such as health, 
previous occupation, and property ownership. Provided that I control for age 
and health, I will be able to identify a pension effect. 
Rewriting the utility-maximizing veteran’s decision function, 
=  -xp  + E, 
where E is a standard normal error term, and X is a vector containing the vector 
of demographic and socioeconomic variables and of utility shifters 2,  income 
y, and prices of consumption bundles p,  and pd under the independent living 
and coresidence options, respectively. Although I cannot directly observe the 
prices that a veteran faces, I can observe such characteristics as marital status 
that will determine the price of household goods the veteran faces. Although I 121  Displacing the Family 
cannot observe household income, I  can observe pension income and such 
proxies for other household income as past occupation. I cannot observe the 
children’s earnings. But, if the altruism model holds, total family income deter- 
mines the coresidence decision. If a bargaining model holds, children’s income 
might determine coresidence if  children  give  transfers  to parents  to avoid 
coresidence. In fact, figure 6.6 above showed that the probability  that a child 
would have a parent present in the household was much greater for wealthier 
children, children who were either farmers or professionals  or proprietors 
rather than laborers. Low-wage laborers may not have been able to afford to 
welcome their parents into their homes, nor might their parents have wanted to 
move into the cramped quarters of a laborer. Fortunately, omitting children’s 
earnings from my empirical specification  will  not bias my estimates of  the 
effect of pension income on the probability  of coresidence. Pension  income 
and children’s earnings are unlikely to be correlated. Most individuals received 
pensions only after  1890, long after they had invested in their children’s hu- 
man capital. 
The value of I*, the difference in utilities under either residence option, is 
also not observed, but a discrete headship indicator is observed, given by 
z={  O  ifZ*<O, 
1  otherwise, 
where 1 represents dependence and 0 independence. The probit equation that 
is then estimated is 
prob(Z  = 1)  = prob(& < X’P) = WX’P), 
where @(  ) is a standard normal cumulative distribution  function. Because 
independent living is costly, a veteran with a high pension will have less of a 
need for the free market goods and household services that he can obtain with 
coresidence than a veteran with a low pension. Therefore, two individuals iden- 
tical in all characteristics except pension income may be expected to have dif- 
ferent living arrangements. If the individual  with the low pension  picks the 
coresidence option while the individual with the high pension  does not, this 
suggests that independent living is preferred to coresidence. Only insufficiency 
of income inhibits it. 
In  comparing living arrangements among retired  veterans  controlling  for 
characteristics, the measure of coresidence that I use as a dependent variable 
is a dummy variable equal to one if the veteran lived in a household that an 
extended family member headed. This measure is a useful indicator of depen- 
dence on family members. Recall that this measure differs across veterans and 
nonveterans and that the secular decline in this coresidence indicator has been 
ongoing since 1880. 
The sample is restricted to noninstitutionalized veterans who had retired by 
1910. The control variables are derived from the 1900 and 1910 censuses and 122  Chapter6 
the pension and surgeons’ records. They include number of children, health, 
age, changes in marital status between 1900 and 1910, property ownership in 
1900, occupation, literacy, foreign birth, extent of  urbanization in county of 
residence, and geographic region. Foreign birth may determine social norms 
governing the living arrangements of  the elderly. The previous chapter dis- 
cussed differences in farmers’ retirement and subsequent living arrangements 
by ethnicity. Those who are older and those who are in poor health may find it 
more costly to maintain their independence. Changes in marital status should 
matter to the residence decision because the spouse may provide a stream of 
household services that are not so easily or cheaply replaced by hired help but 
may be replaced by a daughter or daughter-in-law. More important, hired help 
may be a poor substitute for the companionship of family members. The num- 
ber of children will matter because only those with children can be dependent 
on their families. Property ownership and occupation in 1900 will be proxies 
for wealth holdings, but property ownership might also reflect any difficulties 
in liquidating assets. Property ownership is known only for men who were 
household heads in 1900. Therefore, the lack of property is also an indicator 
of  1900 living arrangements, which will be correlated with  1910 living ar- 
rangements among those who had retired in 1900. 
The probit results are presented in table 6.1. A $1.00 increase in monthly 
pension amount lowered the probability of coresidence by 0.0075. Evaluated 
at the pension means, the elasticity of coresidence with family members with 
respect to pensions was -0.77  (= -0.0075  [18.93/0.1847]). No sharp changes 
in coresidence at specific pension amounts could be detected. Interactions of 
pension amount with age dummies, health, and occupation yielded coefficients 
that were small and insignificant. There were no sharp changes in coresidence 
at the ages at which Union army veterans became eligible for a larger pension. 
The coresidence decision of those in higher-paying occupations was less sensi- 
tive to pension income, but the effect was very small and insignificant. 
Because Union army pensions represented a pure income effect, the esti- 
mated elasticity of  coresidence with family members with respect to Union 
army pensions can be used to determine the effect of increases in income on 
coresidence rates. Assuming that the assets of  the elderly kept pace with per 
capita GNP and increased by  32 percent between 1910 and 1940, the estimated 
elasticity implies that up to 86 percent of the decline in coresidence rates be- 
tween 1910 and 1940 can be explained by increases in income. 
Other important cross-sectional determinants of  coresidence were age and 
changes in marital status. The probability of coresidence was lower at younger 
ages. Changes in marital status raised the probability of  coresidence by  the 
substantial amount of 0.1861. When pension amount was interacted with the 
dummy indicator for changes in marital status, the results were inconclusive 
but suggested that pensions were especially likely to affect the coresidence 
decisions of widowers. Pensions do not appear to have affected the remarriage 
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Table 6.1  Probit of Probability of Living with Family Members as Dependent 
among Retirees, with Coresidence as the Dependent Variable 
(361 observations, pseudo R*  = .27) 
Variable  Mean  Coef.  S.E.  aptax 
Dummy = 1 if coresiding 
Constant 
Monthly pension 
Age in 1910 
Number of children 
Number of children squared 
Dummy = 1 if: 
Poor health 
Health status unknown 
1900 occupation: 
Professional or proprietor 
Artisan 
Laborer 
Owned no property 
Illiterate 
Foreign born 
Marital status changed 
Lives in Midwest in 1910 
100 or more people per square 




















































-  .002 1 
.0261 
-  .0033 
-.0073 
-  m7.5 
-  .0385 






Note: The omitted dummies are good health and farmer. The symbols *, i’,  and  indicate that the 
coefficient is significantly different from zero at at least the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 
levels, respectively. aptax = p(l/n) X  4 (x’p), where 4 is the standard normal density and is 
aptax is in probability units. 
Source: Costa (in press). 
more likely to have remarried compared to their nonveteran counterparts. Al- 
though changes in marital status are an important explanation of coresidence 
in this cross section, the decreased probability of an older man being widowed 
could not explain the decrease in coresidence from 1910 to 1940. The percent- 
age of  men older than sixty-four who were married remained unchanged, at 
around 67 percent, between these years. However, since 1940 older men’s prob- 
ability of being widowed has fallen sharply. In 1990,77 percent of men older 
than sixty-four were married. 
The number of children, whether included linearly or as a spline, was insig- 
nificant. But the signs on the coefficients suggest that those with fewer children 
were less likely to coreside with their extended family as dependent relations, 
a finding consistent with numerous studies using recent data (e.g., Wolf  1994). 
The point estimates should therefore be used to investigate the effect of kin 
availability on coresidence. The elderly aged sixty-five or older in 1910 had on 
average 3.5 surviving children, those in 1940 2.2, and those in 1990 2.0.” The 
decrease in the number of  surviving children between 1910 and 1940 could 124  Chapter6 
therefore  account for a 0.03 decline in the probability  of  coresidence, or 30 
percent of the actual decline. From  1940 to 1990 the decrease in the number 
of surviving children predicts only a 0.003 decline in the probability of coresi- 
dence, less than 2 percent of the actual decline. 
Occupation was an insignificant predictor of coresidence. Not owning prop- 
erty was a significant, positive predictor, but only because those who were not 
households heads in 1900, and hence owned no property, were mc-e likely to 
coreside with family members. When the sample is restricted to men who were 
household heads in 1900, the coefficient on property ownership still suggests 
that the wealthier were less likely to reside with a family member who was a 
household head, but the coefficient was not statistically significant. Ethnicity 
remained insignificant even when  the foreign  born  were divided into ethnic 
Germans and other foreign born. 
Population density was not a significant predictor of the living arrangements 
of the elderly, but in a national sample coresidence was less likely among the 
retired living in a metropolitan  rather than a nonmetropolitan  area in  1910. 
Recall that figure 6.4 above showed that, by 1910,  metropolitan and nonmetro- 
politan rates of coresidence were fairly similar and that, by  1950, coresidence 
rates were higher in metropolitan than in nonmetropolitan areas. Thus, the in- 
creasing urbanization  of  the United States is an unlikely explanation for the 
long-term decline in coresidence rates. 
The coefficient on poor health is insignificant, but its sign implies that those 
in poor health were more likely to pick the coresidence option. Its insignifi- 
cance is consistent with findings from recent data that most health variables- 
with the exception of those indicating a severe disability, such as difficulty in 
meal  preparation,  money  management,  and phone  use-are  not  associated 
with the probability of living alone (Wolf  1990). Although the proportion of 
the population that is severely disabled probably has fallen, this improvement 
would  be  hard  to quantify  until  more  detailed  diagnostic  information  be- 
comes available.’* 
Although pensions were supposed to be awarded regardless of the veteran’s 
financial status, employees of the Pension  Bureau may have awarded higher 
pensions to those living with their families if they regarded coresidence as an 
indicator of need. Pension amount is therefore potentially endogenous. There- 
fore, I use whether a recruit applied under the General Law as an instrumental 
variable. As in chapter 3, I estimate a probit model with an endogenous explan- 
atory  variable  using  two-stage  conditional  maximum  likelihood  estimation 
(Rivers and Vuong 1988) under the assumption that the indicator variable for 
whether the recruit applied under the General Law is a legitimate instrument. 
A Hausman test for exogeneity of pension amount suggests that endogeneity 
is not a problem. Table 6.2 compares the derivatives  of the probit estimates 
with  those  from  a  two-stage  conditional  maximum  likelihood  procedure 
among the men for whom information on the law that they applied under is 
available. The first-stage estimates are also presented. The change in the coef- Table 6.2  Comparison of Derivatives from Probit and from Two-Stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Determinants of 
Coresiding with Extended Family, with Coresidence in 1910 as the Dependent Variable (352 observations) 
Two-Stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood 
Variable 
First Stage:  Second Stage: 
Adj. R2 = .36  Pseudo R2 = .27 
Probit: 
wax  Coef.  S.E.  Coef.  S.E.  apiax 
Dummy = 1 if applied under General Law  10.4657$  ,8234 
Constant  -4.3  I I8  5.2133  -8.5259$  1.3543 
Monthly pension  -  ,0084  -  .0407*  .0222  -  ,008  1 
Age in 1910  ,0204  .3119$  .0693  .1029$  ,0190  ,0203 
Number of  children  .0188  -.1872  .3980  ,0941  ,1052  .O 186 
Number of children squared  -  ,0024  ,0350  .04 16  -.0114  ,0119  -.0022 
Dummy = 1 if 
Poor health  ,0226  1.0198  ,8504  ,1089  .20  13  .02 15 
Health status unknown  -  ,0083  2.2378  1.4675  p.0573  .3271  -.0113 
1900 occupation: 
Professional or proprietor  -.0082  -2.1099  1.1682  -  .04W  .2620  -  .0079 
Artisan  -.0093  -  1.0035  1.4594  -.0503  .2958  -  .0099 
Laborer  -.0333  -  1.6120  1.1040  -1.6195  1.1044  -.0319 
Owned no property  .I489  -  1.9222  .9018  ,7617  ,2015  ,1506 
Illiterate  -.I138  -3.53 12$  1.605  I  -  ,5955  .4368  -.I177 
Foreign born  -.I308  -  .2705  1.3243  -  ,6602  ,3413  -.I305 
Marital status changed  .I832  .8585t  1.0492  .9241$  ,2049  ,1826 
Lives in Midwest in 1910  .0675  -3.2096$  1.2430  ,3553  .3174  ,0702 
100 or more people per square mile, I9 10, 
in county residence  ,0757  1.207  1  1.0453  .38 I8  .2237  ,0755 
Residuals first stage  ,005  1  ,0253  -.0010 
Note: The first stage is a regression of  pension amount on the exogenous variables and whether the veteran applied under the General Law. The second stage is a 
probit with the exogenous variables, pension amount, and the first-stage residuals as explanatory variables. The standard errors have been corrected. The symbols *, 
t,  and $ indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at at least the 10 percent, 5 percent, and  I  percent levels, respectively. aPldx = p(l/n)  6 
(x’p), where I$ is the standard normal density, and PI& is in probability units. 126  Chapter6 
ficient on pension amount is small, with the estimated mean effect of a dollar 
increase  in monthly  pension  amount on the coresidence probability  falling 
from -0.0084  when a probit is estimated to -0.0081  when two-stage condi- 
tional maximum likelihood  estimation is used. The elasticity of  coresidence 
with respect to pension amount is -0.80  (= -0.0081  [18.93/0.1905]). 
I have  shown that  my  estimate of  the effect of  Union army pensions on 
living arrangements is unbiased. I can therefore  use the elasticity of coresi- 
dence with respect to pension income to calculate the effect of a 100 percent 
reduction  in pension  amount (from $18.93 to $0.01 per month) on average 
coresidence rates in both the Union army sample and the random sample of 
Union army veterans. This pension reduction would increase the percentage of 
veterans  residing  in households headed by  a family member from 20 to 36 
percent in the Union army sample and from 14 to 25 percent in the random 
sample of veterans. Because 32 percent of nonveterans in the random sample 
were living in an extended household that they did not head, 60-100  percent 
of the difference in coresidence rates between Union army veterans and non- 
veterans can therefore be attributed to pensions. 
Recall from chapter 3 that another source of variation in the Union army 
pension  program  was  disparate treatment  by  type of  veteran.  Confederates 
were ineligible. As noted in chapter 3, in 1910 Union pensioners were collect- 
ing an average pension of $17 1.90 per year, and about 90 percent of all Union 
veterans were on the pension rolls, whereas Confederates were collecting an 
average pension  of just $47.24 per year from southern states, and fewer than 
30 percent of all Confederate veterans  were receiving  a pension. Therefore, 
the difference in coresidence rates by veteran status in a southern-born sample 
should reflect a veteran effect, while the difference in coresidence by veteran 
status in a northern-born  sample should reflect both a veteran  and a pension 
effect. In fact, among retirees in the southern-born sample, there was no differ- 
ence in coresidence by veteran status.”  But, among retirees in the northern- 
born sample, 17 percent of veterans lived in households headed by a family 
member, compared to 30 percent of nonveterans. 
Lower coresidence rates among Union compared to Confederate veterans 
persist even controlling for age, marital status, farm residence, literacy, urban- 
ization, and region of residence (see table 6.3). Note, that in contrast to figure 
6.4 above, coresidence was less common among households in rural than in 
urban areas. But, when the variable indicating farm residence is omitted, the 
coefficient on rural area implies that coresidence was more common among 
households in rural areas. Because farmers who retired moved to nearby, rural 
towns, then, controlling for farm residence, coresidence was less common in 
these rural areas than in urban areas. 
The coefficient on Confederate veteran in the southern-born  regression  in 
table 6.3 shows that being a Confederate veteran had an insignificant, positive 
effect on the probability  of coresidence. The coefficient on Union veteran in 
the northern-born  regression  is positive and significant, implying that Union 
veterans were less likely to coreside with their extended families than northern- Table 6.3  Probit of Probability of Living with Family Members as Dependent among White, Native-Born Retirees, Aged 60-87  in 1910 
(from Public-Use Sample), with Coresidence as the Dependent Variable 
Variable 
Northern Born  Southern Born 
(I  ,775 observations, pseudo R’  = .28)  (385 observations, pseudo R’  = .32) 
Parameter  Parameter 
Mean  Est.  S.E.  apiax  Mean  Est.  S.E.  apiiix 
Dummy = I  if coresiding 
Intercept 





Lives on farm 
Lives in Northeast 
Lives in South 
Lives in Midwest 
Lives in West 











.6  I 
7 I .54 
-  1.8423$ 
-  .23 12$ 
-  1.1607$ 
,1288 
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37 
































.2  128 





-  .009 I 
.0069 
-  ,0525 
,001 I 
Source: Costa (in press) 
Note: The sample consists of white, noninstitutionalized, native-born men aged 60-87  drawn from the 1910 census (Ruggles and Sobek 1995). Rural areas are defined 
as all unincorporated places and all incorporated places with fewer than 2,500 residents. The omitted dummy is residence in the East in the northern-born equation 
and residence in the South in the southern-born equation. The symbols *, t,  and $ indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at at least the 10 
percent, 5 percent, and  1 percent levels, respectively. 8Pld.x = p(  Ih)  E 4 (x’p), where 4 is the standard normal density, and dP/dx  is in probability units. 128  Chapter6 
born nonveterans. When the northern- and southern-born participation func- 
tions are used to estimate whether the difference in coresidence rates between 
the northern- and the southern-born samples is largely due to differences in 
observable characteristics or in participation behavior, the results imply that at 
least 10 percent of the 11 percentage point difference in coresidence rates be- 
tween the northern- and the southern-born samples can be explained by differ- 
ences in participation behavior and therefore Union army  pension^.'^ 
6.3  Implications 
Union army pensions exerted a sizable, negative effect on the coresidence 
rates of the retired. The elasticity of coresidence with family members with 
respect to Union army pensions was -0.77.  Union army pensions could thus 
explain 60-1 00 percent of the difference in coresidence rates between retired 
Union army veterans and nonveterans and at least 10 percent of the difference 
in coresidence rates between native-born men born in the North and those born 
in the South. Those findings suggest that it is not just the aged of today who 
prefer to live alone (University of Michigan Survey Research Center 1962) but 
the aged of the past as well. Social norms have not changed. Increases in income 
have always been associated  with an increased  demand for the privacy and auton- 
omy provided by  separate living arrangements. Rising incomes have therefore 
contributed enormously to the increase in well-being among the elderly. 
Estimates of the effect of Union army pensions on coresidence rates can be 
used to calculate the effect of a secular increase in income on the secular de- 
cline in coresidence with family members among the retired. These imply that 
up to 86 percent of the decline in coresidence rates between  1910 and 1940 
can be explained by  increases in income. Rising incomes were therefore one 
of  the most important factors enabling the elderly to live alone. Additional 
factors were the decreased probability of the elderly being widowed and the 
increased ratio of elderly to children. The decrease in the number of surviving 
children could explain up to 30 percent of  the decline in coresidence from 
1910 to  1940. Reductions in the probability of  elderly men being widowed 
contributed to declining coresidence rates after 1940. Improvements in elderly 
health have  undoubtedly played a role as well, but their effect could not be 
quantified from the data. 
The role of rising incomes in declining coresidence rates after 1940 is less 
clear. Extrapolations of  the regression results to the present yield nonsensical 
results. One explanation is that, because extrapolating to 1990 falls outside the 
sample range, there may be nonlinearities in living arrangements with income 
that I am not detecting. Michael, Fuchs, and Scott (1980) find that, among 
young, single men and women in the postwar period, the relation between in- 
come and coresidence is S shaped, with the probability of coresidence increas- 
ing slowly at low income levels, then rising sharply at higher income levels, 
before leveling off again. Although I found that pension income had a smaller 
effect on the coresidence decision of those in high-earning occupations, this 129  Displacing the Family 
effect was small and statistically insignificant. Nonetheless, that the average 
elderly man may now be wealthy enough to be unaffected by small changes in 
income cannot be ruled out. 
Another explanation for my inability to extrapolate to the present is that the 
income elasticity of coresidence has fallen, and not just because we have be- 
come a richer society. Using recent data, Borsch-Supan et al. (1992) argue that 
increasing the income of the elderly does not raise the probability of their liv- 
ing  alone  relative  to  the  probability  of  their  living  with  their  children. 
Schwartz, Danziger, and Smolensky (1984) also find that income has a small 
effect on the propensity of the elderly to live alone. Although Michael, Fuchs, 
and Scott (1980) find that income has a substantial effect on the coresidence 
propensities of the elderly, they may have estimated a high income effect be- 
cause they were examining a sample of  widows. Recall that my  results sug- 
gested that Union army pension income had a particularly large effect on the 
coresidence decision of widowers, suggesting that the responsiveness of  the 
widowed to income changes may be greater than that of the married. 
The income elasticity of coresidence may have declined because, now that 
only 5 percent of older men live in their children’s homes, those who do so are 
likely to have special needs or tastes. The income elasticity of coresidence may 
now be lower because the price of independent living fell. The income effect 
as I and other researchers have  measured it probably incorporates some re- 
sponse to price changes. The appearance of single-portion food products, the 
growth of housing for single individuals and of retirement communities in low- 
cost living areas, the declining price of transport and of  communication with 
family members, and the rise in private and state social support services have 
lowered the price of the elderly living alone. If independent living is now rela- 
tively inexpensive, changes in income may have  a relatively small effect on 
coresidence rates. 
Independent living may be not only cheaper than it was in the past but also 
much more attractive. Today, a leisurely retirement lifestyle, filled with recre- 
ational activities, including mass tourism, low-impact sports such as golf, and 
inexpensive entertainments, is often made possible by resettlement to a com- 
munity with a better climate or other environmental amenities or to one with a 
low cost of living. Since 1940, the demand by the elderly for residence in an 
area with a warm February temperature has increased, even though the price 
has risen (Cragg and Kahn  1997). Such a community is not necessarily one 
in which children or relatives reside, but it is one with greater recreational 
opportunities, As recreational opportunities have expanded, independent living 
may have become more attractive.  The increasing attractiveness of independent 
living may in turn have increased the attractiveness of retirement. The income 
elasticity of  retirement is now  lower than it was  in  1900, implying that the 
retirement decision of older men is simply no longer as responsive to changes 
in income. One explanation is that retirement is now much more attractive. 
The elderly can now  live independently, spending their time in recreational 
pursuits. 130  Chapter6 
6.4  Summary 
This chapter has shown that, since 1880,  increasing numbers of retirees have 
been living by themselves. In 1880,46  percent of all retired men age sixty-five 
or older were living in a household headed by children or other relatives. By 
1940, this fraction had fallen to 22 percent and, by  1990, to 5 percent. In con- 
trast, among all men age sixty-five or older and still in the labor force, the 
fraction living in a household headed by children or other relatives was only 
10 percent in  1880, 6 percent in 1940, and 4 percent in  1990. Differences in 
living arrangements by  retirement  status have narrowed. This difference has 
narrowed, not because of changes in social norms, or because the ratio of aged 
parents to adult children has fallen, but because incomes have risen. Although 
retirees in the past would have preferred to lead lives independent of those of 
their children, they simply could not have afforded to do so. Income has now 
become a less important determinant of living arrangements than it was in the 
past, perhaps because it has become increasingly attractive for the elderly to 
live alone. 
Appendix 6A 
Table 6A.1  Percentage of Noninstitutionalized Men 65 or Older Who Were 
Household Heads and Who Did Not Live in Extended Families, by 
Retirement Status 
9% Not Living in 
9%  Household Heads  Extended Family 
Not  Not 







































































Nore: See figs. 6.1 and 6.2. Estimated I'rom the integrated  public-use census series (Rugglcs and 
Sobek 1995). Living  in an extended family is defined as living in  a household  in which family 
members other than the wife are present. The number of retired was calculated using the concept 
of  gainful employment prior to  1940 and the concept of  current  employment in 1940 and  later. 
The basic pattern remains unchanged if the institutionaliLed are included. Table 6A.2  Percentage Household Heads and Percentage Living in an Extended Family among Noninstitutionalized Men 65 or Older 
Household, by  Retirement Status 
~  ~~~~~ 
% Household Heads and Living 
in Extended Family 
% Household Heads and Not 
Living in Extended Family 
% Not Household Heads and 
Living in Extended Family 
% Not Household Heads and 
Not Living in Extended Family 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Not  Not  Not  Not 









































21.5  17.8 
24.6  18.8 
28.4  26.5 
32.8  30.2 
39.4  38.3 
49.1  47.2 
62.5  61.3 
72.4  72.5 
74.4  74.9 










































































Source: Costa (in press). 
Nore: See fig. 6.3. See previous table for sources. 132  Chapter6 
Notes 
1. The phrase of an elderly Bostonian interviewed by Gratton (1986, 59). 
2. In  1900 only 14 percent of these households contained married children. Although 
by 1950 this figure had risen to 30 percent, in 1990 it was down to 9 percent. (Estimated 
from the integrated public-use census series.) Because a child who was well established 
financially would most likely be married, transfers across family members within these 
households probably went from parents to children, not the other way around. 
3. The longitudinal data described in the next section shows that 53 percent of the 
men who in  1910 were not household heads and who lived with their children, but 
whose living arrangements in 1900 differed, had moved to a different town. Of those 
who had moved to another town, approximately 80 percent changed residences. 
4. The fraction was probably lower among men. 
5. Similar findings are reported in Ohio Health and Old Age Insurance Commission 
6. Dissenting opinion in Massachusetts Commission on Old Age Pensions (1910). 
7. Estimated  from the  integrated  public-use census  sample  (Ruggles and  Sobek 
1995). Probit regressions showed that the presence of an aged parent in the household, 
whether male or female, working or retired, was a positive predictor of a teenage child 
being in school and a negative predictor being employed. This relation may exist because 
the presence of an aged parent may have been an indicator that the household was well off. 
8. The probabilities used in constructing fig. 6.6 were predicted probabilities evalu- 
ated at 1950 mean values to account for differences in household characteristics and in 
the age structure of the population both over time and across occupational groups. The 
probit regressions that were estimated included as control variables the age of  the 
household head, the number of  children in the household, race, foreign birth, occupa- 
tion (including none), region of residence, and extent of urbanization. 
9. These probabilities are predicted and evaluated at 1950 mean values. Probit regres- 
sions were estimated in which the dependent variables were age, marital status, occupa- 
tion, race, extent of urbanization, and region of residence. 
10. The percentage of  men who were not household heads and lived with extended 
family members was greater in the Union army sample than in the random sample of 
Union army veterans, perhaps because residing with nonrelatives was not an option in 
rural areas. 
11. The 1910 census asked women the number of children ever born and the number 
of  children surviving. Among women sixty-five years of  age or older the respective 
averages were 5.5 and 3.5. Later censuses asked women only the number of children 
ever born. The average woman age sixty-five or older in 1940 had borne 3.8 and one in 
1990 2.5 children. Assuming that a 1900 life table represents the mortality experience 
of children born to women age sixty-five or older in 1940 and a 1940 life table that of 
children born to women age sixty-five or older in 1990, the number of  surviving chil- 
dren would be 2.2 and 2.0, respectively. 
12. Alternatively, the insignificance of the coefficient on poor health might suggest 
that the health variable that I use might be a poor proxy for true health. If it is indeed a 
poor proxy, then, because those with higher pensions are less healthy, the effect of 
pension income on coresidence will be overstated. One solution would be to use another 
health proxy as an instrument for poor health. When I used subsequent mortality as an 
instrument for poor health, the sign of the coefficient on poor health reversed but was 
still insignificant, and the coefficient on pension amount remained unchanged. 
13. Thirty-six percent of retired southern-born nonveterans in  1910 were living in 
households headed by a family member, compared to 38 percent of veterans. The differ- 
ence is not statistically significant. 
(  19  19) and Pennsylvania Old Age Pension Commission (  19  19). 
14. The absolute value of the actual difference in coresidence rates is 10.2. 